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ABSTRACT
Today, the abstention rate continues to rise, largely due to the need to travel to vote. This is why remote evoting will increase the turnout by allowing everyone to vote without the need to travel. It will also minimize
the risks and obtain results in a faster way compablack to a traditional vote with paper ballots. In fact,
given the high stakes of an election, a remote e-voting solution must meet the highest standards of security,
reliability, and transparency to gain the trust of citizens. In literature, several remote e-voting solutions based
on blockchain technology have been proposed. Indeed, the blockchain technology is proposed today as a
new technical infrastructure for several types of IT applications because it allows to remove the TTP and
decentralize transactions while offering a transparent and fully protected data storage. In addition, it allows
to implement in its environment the smart-contracts technology which is used to automate and execute
agreements between users. In this paper, we are interested in reviewing the most revealing e-voting solutions
based on blockchain technology.
INDEX TERMS Authentication, blockchain, e-voting, privacy, security, smart-contracts, transparency.

I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, remote electronic voting (e-voting) has
emerged to increase voter turnout while allowing everyone
to vote without the need to travel. On the one hand, the
abstention rate has been steadily increasing, largely due to the
need to travel to vote. On the other hand, in many countries,
the transparency of elections is increasingly challenged and
undermined [1]. Moreover, it seems relevant, even necessary,
to rethink the protocols of current voting systems to make
them more transparent, inclusive, and close to citizens while
maintaining a maximum level of security. Therefore, the application of blockchain technology to ensure e-voting appears
to be an interesting prospect to meet these challenges.
Indeed, Internet voting has already been implemented in
several countries for small-scale elections, but it is still
hesitant. The risks of attacks are too important and the low
scalability of such voting processes does not yet allow to consider it for national elections. The process remains, like paper
voting, very complicated to verify and audit for a citizen who
has no control over the voting system. To overcome these
problems, blockchain appears to be a promising technology
[2]–[4].

Blockchain is an emerging technology whose full potential
has not yet been realized and on which more and more
applications are being built. It was first used to exchange
cryptocurrency with the creation of the Bitcoin system in
2008. Due to its decentralized, anonymous, and secure nature, it has been used in many projects that requiblack a
technology to store and exchange information without going
through a Trusted Third Party (TTP) [5].
In this paper, we are interested in reviewing the most
revealing e-voting solutions based on Blockchain technology
to understand their particularities and what they can bring
compablack to traditional voting. Our approach is as follows:
we gatheblack as much information as possible about the
state of blockchain technology applied to e-voting from
research papers published between 2010 and 2021. Then,
we extracted several properties shablack by most blockchainbased e-voting applications. In doing so, we defined a subset
of comparison criteria by grouping them (the extracted properties) into 4 themes: voter authentication methods, voting
encryption/hashing algorithms, resistance to attacks, security
properties.
This paper is organized as follows. Related works are
1
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introduced in section II. In section III, we briefly present
what is the blockchain technology. In section IV, we compare
the blockchain-based e-voting applications within several
categories while in section V, we discuss the limits and issues
raised by this technology. The last section concludes the
paper.
II. RELATED WORKS

To take advantage of the benefits of it, blockchain technology
was recently proposed as a new technical infrastructure for
the development of several types of IT (Information Technology) applications, including e-voting applications. Indeed,
although the principle of e-voting is consideblack as an
old concept, it has now become a viable solution with the
democratization of blockchain technology. The authors of the
paper [6] wrote an empirical review of e-voting applications
using blockchain technology. They began by establishing the
challenges that e-voting applications face: privacy, lack of
evidence, fraud resistance, ease of use, scalability, speed, and
cost. They compablack a set of e-voting applications that they
believed coveblack all aspects to create a robust system. They
did this by comparing 14 applications on 6 properties, indicating in a table whether and how each implementation met
each criterion. Indeed, there were not enough criteria in this
paper to compare all the specifics of e-voting applications.
The approach inspiblack our paper, but we expanded the list
of specifics and did our tables differently.
The paper [7] is based on using a technique called "systematic mapping" introduced in [8]. It is organized around
five research questions whose answers, according to the
authors, cover the entire scope of their review: (1) What are
the current e-voting system gaps ? (2) Can the blockchain
concept improve e-voting systems ? (3) What are the research topics and proposed solutions that have been published in blockchain-based e-voting ? (4) Which blockchain
platforms/consensus models are used? (5) What are the future research directions for the blockchain-based e-voting
system? They have answeblack all these questions and more
specifically question (3), which focuses on comparing between e-voting applications that are based on blockchain
technology. They classified these applications into 5 categories, where each category represents the main purpose of
the application or its main feature. This classification is not
enough and it is not based on an obvious comparison between
the applications. In our paper in hand, we extracted several
properties shablack by most blockchain-based e-voting applications, and then we defined a subset of comparison criteria
by grouping them (the extracted properties) into 4 themes and
hence 4 tables.
The authors of the paper [9] described the use of
blockchain-based e-voting applications in real-world scenarios. They then extracted a set of properties that a blockchainbased e-voting application should satisfy to be a fair, transparent and democratic election system. These properties
are public and individual verifiability, dependability and reliability, consistency, auditability, anonymity, transparency,

scalability, eligibility, authentication, and fairness. Subsequently, they compablack 8 blockchain-based e-voting systems, highlighting their respective strengths and weaknesses
compablack to previously established properties, and they
proposed some improvements.
Our paper used a similar methodology and objective to
those published by the authors in the paper [10]. The analysis
of the subject proposed in this paper is very interesting and
our work is in line with it. Otherwise, our work differs from
the latter and thus brings a new approach to the topic of
blockchain-based e-voting. Indeed, our work complements
the paper [10] since we propose about thirty additional
references in the comparison of implementations. We have
been able to use more recent papers and have used a more
inclusive selection technique than the one proposed in [10].
In the latter, the authors identified several exclusion criteria
that we did not apply in the preliminary search, allowing
us to study other relevant papers. In addition, we relied on
other published literature reviews that reference and compare voting applications. This allowed us to gather outside
opinions, both positive and negative, on articles proposing
voting applications, and thus gain cblackibility. While the
overall approach to the systematic literature review is similar,
the criteria for comparison differ for some. In our paper,
section IV-A details the voting process proposed by each
voting application. Moreover, section IV-B compares the
voter authentication methods, which is not specified in [10].
These differences make it possible to compare differently and
more widely these e-voting implementations and thus bring
novelty to the field of e-voting with the blockchain.
Our paper provides a more complete and richer comparison. It is designed as a guide for any research on the
subject. Our paper not only compares the existing solutions
but makes it easy to customize solutions based on specific
criteria that are crucial for e-voting. We have determined a
set of criteria that we have deemed very specific to include as
many blockchain-based e-voting applications as possible in
our comparison. In this way, our proposed work should help
the community to focus on certain criteria and to compare the
proposals of several applications as well.
III. BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY

Blockchain is a form a distributed ledger where participants
can store and exchange information directly with each other
without the need to know or trust each other’s beforehand. A
blockchain implements the concept by aggregating records
into blocks of data that are cryptographically signed to prevent data tampering. The usual method is to create a hash
of the previous records and insert in the header of the next
block of data. Thus, each block depends on the previous one
and any attempt to modify a record in the chain would modify
the hashes of the blocks down the chain. For the participants
to identify valid records chain and guarantee integrity of
data, participants of a blockchain must agree on a consensus
protocol [5].
Bitcoin blockchain uses a Proof-of-Work consensus. Each
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miner will try to reverse the hash of the previous transactions
to gain a reward. Reversing a hash is a computationally heavy
operation, but verifying it is very easy and so it would be
impossible to fake a hash and have all the nodes agree on
it, unless one owns more than 50% of the computational
power of the miners [11]. Proof-of-Stake is a protocol that
does not need a lot of computational power where miners are
randomly selected by how much coins they dedicate to be a
miner. These funds are stoblack and can be taken back. However, mining power would also increase with wealth which
would mean that the biggest coin owners could centralize the
blockchain [12].
To make trusted applications, the consensus protocol of the
hosting networking. The paper [13] draws a comparison table
between different consensus algorithms and their malicious
nodes tolerance. A Proof-of-Stake algorithm has a tolerance
of 51%. As an indicator, which is currently using a Proofof-Work algorithm and will upgrade as a Proof-of-Stake with
Ethereum 2.0 has 57.2% of its coins stoblack in the top 10000
wallets.
The blockchain mainly differs on what consensus protocol they are implementing. These protocols usually also
define the permission degree of a blockchain. That means
what operations participants can do on the blockchain. A
blockchain is called public when any entity can read, and
permissionless if such entities can also write. There is usually
a trade-off between permissions/centralization and scalability. A blockchain with restrictive read/write policy where
the authentication of data is left to a few trusted nodes is
generally more efficient than a public and permissionless
blockchain as the consensus is easier to reach. However,
blockchain’s goal is to decentralize governance to make
trusted data transactions and applications so, depending on
the use, a compromise must be made between decentralization and efficiency [5], [14].
Blockchain 2.0 is born from the ability to make decentralized applications with smart contracts. Nick Szabo first
defines a smart contract in [15] and describes it as a computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a
contract. Blockchain smart contracts were first implemented
in Ethereum by Vitalik Buterin in [16] that was designed
like a decentralized computer that supports Turing-complete
scripts. The paper [17] describes Ethereum, its limits and its
functionalities, including its potential use as a support for
issuing tokens.
Blockchain is evolving toward 3.0 as technology improves
and decentralized applications are developed. The authors of
the paper [18] propose a survey of the different new usages
of blockchain 3.0 including e-voting where blockchain brings
new solutions to the problem.
IV. COMPARISON

In the following, we compare the proposed blockchainbased e-voting applications based on the following five main
thematic categories: (A) implementations used, (B) voter
authentication methods, (C) voting encryption/hashing algorithms, (D) resistance to attacks and (E) security properties.

A. IMPLEMENTATIONS USED

The different blockchain-based e-voting applications share
the same overall voting process, from voter registration to
the announcement of the result. In this section, after briefly
stating the general operation of e-voting with blockchain
technology, we develop some technical features of the different implementations.
1) Steps of the E-Voting Procedure
•

•

•

•

•

Initialization (Phase 1): during this phase, the smart
contracts are initialized with the voting rules, the list
of voters and the list of candidates. Any subsequent
modification of this phase must be made according to
these initial smart contracts. For applications where the
voter must register or confirm his registration, this is
done in this phase [19]–[22]. In many other papers,
registration is not requiblack because a central authority
sends its keys to all voters [23]–[27].
Identification (Phase 2): on the day of the election, the
users connect and identify themselves thanks to the different authentication mechanisms presented in section
IV-B. Sometimes a dedicated website or application is
used [21]. It is not recommended to use a cell phone to
vote because they often hide malware.
Voting (Phase 3): once identification is well done, the
voter chooses one or several candidates according to the
voting rules. The vote is then encrypted using an encryption algorithm or hashed using a hash function (see
section IV-C). The encrypted or hashed vote is finally
added to the blockchain. Indeed, this vote is invisible
and irreversible in many cases. The authors of the paper
[28] propose a solution which allows to perform a second vote to modify the first one. The solution presented
in [29] proposes to rank several candidates and applies
the Borda counting method [30] in the counting phase.
The e-voting application presented in [24] allows the
voter to withdraw its vote before the deadline. In the
paper [31], a ballot is broadcast containing the vote but
can only be decrypted once a sibling block is broadcast
at the end of the voting phase. The authors of the paper
[32] also propose an abstention vote.
Counting (Phase 4): when the end of the election is
declablack, it becomes impossible to change or add
votes. If the counting process takes place in parallel with
the voting, it is essential that the current score is not
visible to anyone to avoid influencing voters who have
not yet voted. It is during this phase that any audits take
place to ensure that no fraud has been committed (see
section IV-E).
Results (Phase 5): through a secure channel, the results
are announced in detail and made accessible to all.

2) Technical features

The consensus protocol is an essential feature of the solutions. The papers [26], [27], [33]–[35] [26], [36]–[52]
propose solutions on the Ethereum blockchain that supports
3
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smart contracts. These smart contracts work like a public
ledger and are used to both record and tally votes. They guarantee privacy and can support custom encryption methods.
However, smart contracts on Ethereum suffer from scalability
issues that can be solved by deploying them on a less decentralized network. The authors of [53] [54]–[60] propose
solutions using smart contracts on Hyperledger Fabric that
can hold up to 100000 transactions per second [53]. Two
papers [61], [62] propose to use Bitcoin as a blockchain
implementation for e-voting. Bitcoin is a well-known opensource blockchain-based cryptocurrency.
The use of blockchain technology cannot completely erase
the presence of a central authority administering the vote. In
addition, a public blockchain could hardly run a nationwide
election due to scalability issues. Many solutions offer a
partially centralized blockchain. The architecture the solution
proposed in [32] is designed with three levels of nodes:
national, constituency and local. The local level consists of all
digital polling stations and is associated with a constituency
node. Constituency nodes hold a subset of local stations and
are connected to national level nodes that add blocks to the
blockchain. In this same paper as well as in [63] and [64],
each candidate has a dedicated chain where the first transaction is the name of the candidate and every other transaction
are votes for him. A vote can be seen as a transaction and
each block contains the hash of the previous block and the
Merkle tree’s root. A transaction must contain the voter’s ID,
his signature, his vote, and a timestamp.
TABLE 1. Voter Authentication

Voter Authentication (Registration)
Phone Number (MSISDN)
ID Document
Validity of Cblackentials (Public/Private
key)
Biometric Identification

Papers
[22]
[20], [21]
[19], [21], [23]–[27]
[29], [31], [65], [66] [46],
[67]

B. VOTER IDENTIFICATION METHODS

As we illustrate in Table 1, one of the categories we were able
to isolate is the voter authentication methods. Indeed, several
authentication methods for the voter have been proposed in
the papers of blockchain-based e-voting applications. There
are papers that fully detail the authentication method while
others only mention it very quickly, which is a problem. The
issue of voter authentication is fundamental to ensure that
votes are not stolen, sold, or extorted. One of the biggest
problems with e-voting is that we cannot guarantee good voting conditions, such as the perfect confidentiality of a voting
booth. To blackuce the impact of this loss of confidentiality,
it is important to ensure that the person voting is who they
say they are. The different methods of authenticating a voter
are classified as follows (see Table 1):
• Authentication with the Mobile Station International
Subscriber Directory Number (MSISDN).
• Authentication with a scan copy of an ID document: ID
card or Passport.

Authentication thanks to the validity of cblackentials:
match between private key and public key [81].
• Biometric authentication: it uses the fingerprint, the iris
of the eyes or facial shape(criteria that can be combined).
For national elections, the only use of the phone number
to authenticate voter identity is presented in the paper [22].
This method of authentication does not allow people who
do not have a phone subscription to access the vote. It
also creates significant security holes by relying on private
telephone operators to obtain citizens’ numbers.
Concerning authentication with an ID document [20],
[21], this poses security and scalability problems. Indeed, it
is necessary for the system to quickly process the scanned
copies of millions of users and verify that the identity
documents correspond to each user. If this verification is
automated, it can be very complicated to implement at large
scale. In addition, the scanned copy would have to be taken
instantly to ensure that it is not a fraud. Therefore, a more
reliable and faster method of authentication should be consideblack.
The most common authentication method in blockchainbased e-voting applications is the matching of a private
and public key pair. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) is very often used [23]–[25]. It allows to
efficiently ensure the conformity of a vote cast by a user without revealing his private key. This asymmetric cryptographic
mechanism is commonly used in blockchain applications because it meets many security criteria (see section IV-E). Nevertheless, this method reaches a limit that is not negligible:
the possibility of selling or stealing the private key of a user.
Indeed, nothing prevents a user from selling his private key
to a person or an organization that could cast a large amount
of votes with impunity. Another problem is the loss of the
password. If a voter loses his password, it is very complicated
to assign another one securely. A hacker could change the
user’s password without his knowledge, which would be
very problematic. The authentication by public/private key
is therefore not perfect and brings the possibility of another
stronger method: biometric authentication [82].
The research papers [29], [31], [65], [66] [46], [67] propose the use of biometric authentication method for the
voter at the time of voting. This proposal seems indeed very
interesting to deal with the key exchange problem mentioned
above. The fingerprint or iris photo of the eye forms a userspecific hash key that is much more secure than an emailed
code. This greatly blackuces the risk of fraud and ensures
that a user who votes is who he claims to be. Nevertheless,
the major problem remains the logistics that this requires on
a large scale: each voter would have to have a device that
allows the transmission of his biometric data, which seems
difficult to achieve now.
If the security of voter authentication seems complicated
to ensure for the moment, the European initiative through the
eIDAS regulation seems to be an interesting perspective to
secure the identification of the voter during an e-vote [83].
•

4
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TABLE 2. Encryption or Hashing of the Vote

Encryption/Hash
Algorithms

SHA-256
Function

Homomorphic
Encrpytion

Zero Knowledge Proof

Papers

[19], [23],
[24],
[63],
[65]

[19]–[21],
[25],
[68],
[69]
[20],
[41],
[43],
[45],
[52],
[70]–[73]

[20], [33]
[38],
[41],
[43],
[45],
[49],
[56],
[58],
[62],
[70], [74]

The eIDAS regulation applies to electronic identification,
trust services and electronic documents. It aims to establish
an interoperability framework for the different systems set up
within the EU Member States to promote the development of
a digital trust market. The regulation defines the requirements
for the mutual recognition of electronic means of identification and electronic signatures for exchanges between public
sector bodies and users.
C. VOTING ENCRYPTION/HASHING ALGORITHMS

Once the user is identified, his vote must be added to the
blockchain while preserving his anonymity. It is at this point
that the vote encryption/hashing algorithms intervene to ensure security and integrity of transactions during the election.
As illustrated in Table 2, there are different functions that can
hash or encrypt the vote at different levels. One of the most
used is SHA-256 [23], [24], [63], [65]. SHA (Secure Hashing
Algorithm) is a cryptographic hash function that produces a
256-bit hash value consisting of 64 hexadecimal characters.
It was designed by the United States Nation Security Agency.
SHA 256 is a new hash function that does not have collusion
problems and seems to be reliable now [88]. The advantage of
this algorithm is that it accepts any input length and produces
an arbitrary output length, whereas most other algorithms
produce a fixed output length.
The Homomorphism encryption property allows to operate on ciphertexts without decrypting them [25]. In the case
of a voting system, this property allows encrypted ballots to
be counted by a third party without any information contained in the ballot being disclosed. Typical homomorphic
cryptosystems applied in a voting system are Paillier encryption (unbounded number of modular additions) and ElGamal
encryption (unbounded number of modular multiplications)
[20], [21]. The homomorphic encryption was also applied in
the e-voting system presented in [69].
The Zero Knowledge Proof is often used in a voting
system [20], [33] [38], [41], [43], [45], [49], [56], [58], [62],
[70], [74] to prove that the statement is indeed what it claims
without revealing any additional information about the statement itself. In a voting system, the voter must convince the
authority that his ballot is valid by proving that the ballot
includes only one legitimate candidate without revealing his
vote.
Blind Signature and Ring Signature are very useful to

Blind
and
Ring
Signature
[26], [75]
[28],
[76]
[25],
[44],
[49],
[52],
[57],
[67],
[73],
[77]–
[80]

Ethereum
Hash Function
(Keccak-256)
[22], [26],
[26],
[27],
[33]–[35], [64]

provide the user’s anonymity and the signer’s privacy [89].
Voting systems use blind signature to convince the tallying
center that the ballot is from a valid voter, without revealing
the owner of the ballot [26]. Simultaneously, the authority
signing the ballot learns nothing about the voter’s choices.
In blind signature, both voters and tallying center must
trust the signer. If the signer is compromised, the signature
scheme may stop working. Unlike blind signature, linkable
ring signature is proposed to avoid untrusted signers. It is
a cryptographic process that allows a person to electronically sign his vote in an anonymous way [28], [76]. This
mechanism involves other users chosen by the author of the
signature (the signer) who are not necessarily informed of
their participation in the creation of the electronic signature.
When the voter signs the ballot, he must include the public
keys of other voters to make his signature indistinguishable
from those of other voters. By comparing the linkability
tag, the authority can easily tell if that voter has already
voted. Nevertheless, to be reliable, these methods require
anonymous channels and trusted signing institutions.
For e-voting applications that are based on the Ethereum
blockchain, they use an Ethereum-specific Hash function
that can be added to other encryption algorithms [26], [27],
[33]–[35], [64].
D. RESISTANCE TO ATTACKS

The resistance of a voting system to external attacks is obviously very important. Some of the papers we have studied
mention the possibility of resisting certain attacks, although
it is impossible to assert that an application is completely
secure against all cyberattacks. Indeed, if such an application
has not been tested on a large scale, it would be very difficult
to pblackict all possible threats. Therefore, in this section we
will only mention the papers whose application is specifically
protected against one or several attacks (first column of the
Table 3). Otherwise, some papers point out the weaknesses of
certain applications in the face of these same attacks (second
column of the Table 3).
DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) are one of the most
critical challenges facing cyber-attack experts today. Many evoting applications using Blockchain claim to face this type
of attack [21], [26], [27], [34], [35], [63], [64] [44], [72] .
The distribution of the service across different nodes, which
is possible with a Blockchain, appears to be a solution to the
5
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TABLE 3. Resistance to Attacks

Attack/Threat
DDOS
Sybil Attack
Man of the Middle
Byzantine Fault
Coercion

Application is resistant
[21], [26], [26], [27], [34], [35], [63], [64] [44],
[72]
[21], [25], [27], [63]
[44], [53]
[20], [25], [27], [31]–[33], [63], [75]
[21], [26], [31] [39], [74], [80], [85]

Brute-Force Attack

[23], [87]

DDoS attack because it is almost impossible for the adversary
to compromise all the servers. If a DDoS attack occurs,
the system will continue to operate without any interruption
due to its distributed nature. Since Blockchain nodes work
together independently, the architecture of these e-voting
applications is designed to avoid single points of failure.
Some texts mention a possible resistance to the Sybil
attack [25], [27], [63]. These different approaches to Sybil
attack prevention are identity validation, social trust graph
algorithms, economic costs, personhood validation, and
application-specific defenses. However, as mentioned earlier,
the possibility of generating new identities does not seem to
be excluded, especially if the authentication system is fragile.
In such an attack, the attacker bypasses the reputation system
of a peer-to-peer network by creating a large quantity of identities and using them to have a disproportionate influence,
which, in the case of a vote, is dramatic. Such an attack could
distort the outcome of the election and elect someone to lead
the government that the people would not have chosen.
Regarding the MITM (Man-In-The-Middle) attack, only
two papers [44], [53] state they are resistant (see Table
3). The other papers do not mention that it resists this
type of attack and this is because the intrinsic properties
of the blockchain allow the resistance to this attack in an
automatic way as follows: since voters and smart contracts
both sign their messages and voting data are encrypted, an
adversary cannot forge the signature or change the data of
the parties involved in the transactions. The public keys used
for signature verification are all visible in the blockchain,
which prevents the adversary from deceiving the parties. It is
indeed impossible to replace the original public key with the
opponent’s without being seen. The encryption of the ballot
also eliminates the possibility of the ballot being leaked.
The Byzantine fault occurs when some of the interlocutors (voters) are unreliable and can change the rules (or
consensus) of a voting process. Many e-voting applications
[25], [27], [32], [33], [63] are Byzantine fault tolerant. This
means that no node in the network can influence other nodes
about the consensus. Furthermore, the nodes do not have the
authority to change the consensus order once it is reached.
The Coercion-Resistance occurs when a voter cannot
cooperate with a coercer to prove to him that he voted in a
certain way. Such a system ensures that the coercer cannot
be convinced of how a voter is voting, even if the voter

Application is not resistant
[22], [28], [33], [53], [84] [25],
[50], [58], [77]
[28]
[22]
[20], [26]–[28], [33], [53] [33],
[40], [41], [45], [50], [60], [78],
[86]
-

cooperates with the coercer. As illustrated in Table 3, apart
from a few exceptions [21], [26], [31] [39], [74], [80],
[85], several applications are susceptible to this type of attack
[20], [26]–[28], [33], [53] [33], [40], [41], [45], [50], [60],
[78], [86] because it is impossible to prevent a user from
voting in front of someone else or selling his key. This is a
major flaw of e-voting that is unfortunately almost impossible
to overcome today. Therefore, the criterion of Forgiveness
has emerged as a more reachable goal than pure coercionresistance. Forgiveness is the ability of a voter to change his
vote after it has been cast. This allows the coerced voter to
change his vote later, once the attacker thinks he has voted a
certain way.
Concerning the Brute-Force attack, few papers like [23]
and [87] specify that they resist it. We can therefore assume
that other applications do not claim to be protected against
such an attack. A brute-force attack consists in trying a
maximum of passwords to enter the system and thus to
commit a vote. The size of the key is then very important
since it directly influences the complexity of such an attack.
E. SECURITY PROPERTIES

A voting system needs to be reliable whether it is paper
voting or online voting. Not only will malicious users always
try to influence the vote and attack from any breach they
discover, but also, for legal reasons, it is necessary to provide
evidence to the losers that they lost the election [4]. In
this section, we will define the minimum-security properties
that any voting system should have. Table 4 presents the
applications that meet these various criteria.
Most of the proposed solutions present the Audit property
as the most fundamental one to check if the system provides
a proof that all its parts work as expected. Indeed, most
systems use several layers in their decentralized applications.
Not only is it requiblack that the reports of each layer be
verifiable, which would mean that the system is auditable,
but also to always verify them, which would make the system
audited. The paper [31] keeps tracking of the whole voting process, including rejected votes. Moreover, employing
smart contract gives more trust to the audit as the code cannot
be tempeblack.
The Voter-Verifiable property is complementary to the
audit property. A user must be able to verify that his vote has
been correctly cast and counted. It can detect attacks that the
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TABLE 4. Security Properties

Properties
Audit
Voter Verifiable

Papers
[20]–[26], [26]–[29], [31], [32], [34], [35], [53], [63]–
[66], [68], [75], [84], [87], [90]–[92]
[19]–[26], [26]–[28], [31]–[35], [53], [63]–[65], [68],
[75], [76], [84], [87], [91], [92] [20], [40], [41], [43]–
[45], [47], [49]–[52], [57]–[60], [62], [74], [80], [85],
[93]–[97]

VoteAlterable
Integrity

[21], [24]–[26], [26], [28], [33], [35], [66], [76], [90]–
[92]
[19], [21]–[26], [26]–[29], [31]–[35], [53], [63]–[66],
[68], [75], [76], [84], [87], [90]–[92] [36], [38], [39],
[48], [60], [77], [78], [96]
Privacy
[19]–[26], [26], [28], [29], [31]–[35], [53], [63]–[66],
[68], [75], [76], [84], [90]–[92] [33], [38]–[41], [43],
[45], [49], [51], [55], [58], [70], [72], [77], [79], [93],
[95]–[98]
Confidentiality [19]–[23], [25], [26], [26], [27], [29], [31]–[33], [53],
[63]–[66], [66], [68], [75], [76], [84], [90]–[92]
Fairness
[21], [26], [26], [27], [29], [31]–[33], [53], [65], [68],
[75], [87] [40], [44], [50], [52], [70], [78]–[80], [95]
Eligibility
[19], [21], [22], [24]–[26], [26], [27], [29], [31]–[35],
[53], [63], [65], [66], [68], [75], [76], [84], [87], [91],
[92] [20], [39], [40], [42], [48], [50], [51], [57], [61],
[67], [74], [78], [80], [95], [97]
Transparency [22], [26], [27], [31], [33], [34], [53], [84], [87], [91]
Receiptfreeness

[20], [25], [28], [37], [40], [41], [45], [53], [62], [66],
[74], [76], [78]

audit property cannot. For example, if a hacker finds a user’s
private key, he may vote on behalf of someone else, which
would not be detected by the audit property and could only
be detected by the actual voter. The paper [53] proposes a
solution where anyone with access rights to the blockchain
can verify that his own ballot has been recorded and that
every ballot has been recorded correctly.
Let us suppose a voter realizes that his vote was not
counted correctly, how would he be able to prove it ? The
Vote-Alterable property gives a user the ability to alter his
own vote. In this way, it will not be the responsibility of the
user to contest his own vote without any need of proof. The
paper [26] labels it Forgiveness property and states that it
is also a weaker property of resistance to coercion, since a
coercer could not be sure that the coerced citizen would not
change his vote.
Data Integrity is an intrinsic property of blockchain technology. [5] states that Data Distribution, Data Replication,
a Cryptographic layer, Data Transparency and Data Immutability are default properties of a blockchain. It guarantees that data must never be alteblack during transmission or
processing, either intentionally or accidentally. In the case of
an application, it is also necessary to verify that a vote is not
counted twice.
The Privacy property is necessary to protect users from
having their personal information leaked. In most systems,
a pair of login and passwords are provided by a central
authority, which holds all the private information of the
voters. The central authority could be the government who
already has all our data. Other systems require a registration

however it is vulnerable to Sybil attacks and hacking. People
could choose a password that has already leaked and a hacker
could usurp their identity or register from a hacked terminal.
It is also necessary to protect the data of each vote which we
call in this paper confidentiality.
The Confidentiality is one of the most important properties. A voter should never be identified from his vote. A vote
will always be decrypted so if a vote link could be made between a vote and a voter, it would be possible to identify who
voted for whom. It is primarily designed to protect voters
from any coercion but also from any repercussions caused by
their vote. A system that does not fulfill this property could be
used by an authoritarian government and give it the ability to
identify those who voted for the opposition, which would not
only put them at risk but also deter people from voting against
them. The paper [68] labels both privacy and confidentiality
properties as privacy. Not only does the system protect its
users’ data but it also encrypts the vote and does not give any
receipt.
The Fairness property means that the election results are
not counted in real time. This way, no one should know which
candidate is ahead in the election and other voters will not
be influenced. The paper [26] proposes to divide the vote by
phase and the tallying phase only starts once the election has
concluded.
The Eligibility property states that only the eligible voters
can cast a vote. This property cannot be strictly fulfilled in
a remote e-voting solution because it requires an Internet
connection and a computer to vote. Not everyone has such
equipment and some people still need to discover new technologies, but we can consider that this problem will be solved
in the future. Some systems require people to buy a token to
vote or pay a high transaction fee, which would discourage
people from voting. The paper [33] proposes a solution where
the administrator has a list of all the eligible actors however it
uses Ethereum that has, in 2021, very high transaction fees as
the network is saturated. We still consider that this solution
guarantees the eligibility property as upcoming upgrades of
Ethereum will lower the transaction fees of the network.
Indeed, the Transparency of the whole voting process is
also a necessary property. An open-source code is always
better, especially when it is from a smart contract because of
smart contract’s transparency properties. On the one hand, it
adds transparency to how data are handled and how security
flaws can be reviewed by peers. On the other hand, it adds
reliability and robustness to the application. The paper [91] is
verifiable as its code base is open source. Nevertheless, while
transparency allows flaws in a system to be revealed and
resolved through the reviews of researchers and computer
scientists, it also opens the door to malicious actors who
could more easily detect security flaws. Transparency can
therefore increase the vulnerability of a system as shown by
the example of the Swiss Post in 2019 which temporarily
published the source code of its voting system [99].
The Receipt-Freeness property is intended to prevent vote
buying where an elector cannot construct a receipt to prove
7
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to a third person that he voted for a certain candidate [40].
V. LIMITS AND ISSUES

In the previous section, we presented and compablack the
different existing e-voting applications using blockchain
technology. If Blockchain technology brings hopes, many
researchers nevertheless claim that electronic voting remains
dangerous and does not significantly increase the turnout
rate [4] [100] [101] [102] [103]. Blockchain is indeed not
a miraculous solution to all the problems that e-voting faces.
It is therefore relevant and necessary to mention the limits
of blockchain for e-voting applications. In this section, we
expose the limitations and problems that these applications
share, for further research in the field of e-voting applications.
A. SCALABILITY

Although there are many proposed e-voting applications using blockchain in theory, only a few have been implemented
and they have only involved small-scale elections as in Sierra
Leone [104]. In fact, Scalability is one of the major challenges of e-voting since the system must be able to handle
millions of votes in a limited time. The problem is that it
is difficult to pblackict the maximum number of simultaneous votes that the system should be able to handle without
crashing. Reorganizing an election after a crash would be
expensive and would not prevent the problem from recurring.
One possibility would be to organize "voting slots" where
each citizen would only be allowed to vote for a certain time
interval. This would again pose problems of anonymity and
increase the complexity of the algorithms during registration
and authentication.
B. GENERAL WEAKNESS: UNPBLACKICTABLE
ATTACKS

Although some applications claim to be prepablack for certain attacks (see Table 3), it is impossible to be prepablack for
all eventualities [4]. A large-scale attack could be carried out
during an election and would have dramatic consequences.
Indeed, the attacker could rig the vote if he manages to
generate his own keys or publish the votes by linking them
to their voter. This could lead to an unprecedented crisis
and would cause voters to lose confidence in the system.
Therefore, e-voting, even with blockchain technology, still
poses major security issues that cannot be avoided for sure.
C. LACK OF SECURITY FOR THE VOTER
IDENTIFICATION

The weakness of the identification system is a major difficulty. Without the use of a Biometric system to ensure the
authentication of the voter (see Table 1 and section IV-B), it
is impossible to be totally sure that the vote is cast by the right
registeblack person. This flaw is important because it can lead
to democratic abuses, especially in case of theft or sale of
authentication keys. If an organization or company wishes to
interfere in an election, it could organize an illegal sale of

voting keys to gather many votes and vote in place of the
people who sold their votes. These voters, disillusioned with
the representative system and traditionally abstainers, would
have the opportunity to make money by not voting. This
would be a disaster for democracy because the richest people
could take power. Vigilance must therefore be maximal on
this aspect of e-voting.
D. DECENTRALIZATION AND EFFICIENCY

There is an intrinsic debate about blockchain that brings
real challenges. While decentralization is at the heart of the
project, to build trust in the voting system and avoid the
involvement of a corrupt third party, such an application must
also be efficient. There is therefore a paradox: we want both
the advantages of a decentralized system, while retaining
the properties of a central authority to manage the vote [4].
Such a utopia is impossible. In any case, it must be admitted
that some centralization is necessary to organize a national
election. But then, hacking of the central authority is made
possible and can have very bad consequences on the vote. It
is therefore essential to realize that blockchain does not solve,
despite its decentralized nature, all the problems related to evoting.
E. DIGITAL DIVIDE

It is important to mention the current problem of the digital
divide [105]. If such an election is to be held, it is necessary to set up e-voting machines in all cities to allow all
citizens, including those who do not have a computer or a
compatible phone, to vote. Indeed, many elderly and lowincome people are excluded from the process of digitizing
public services. Without a real democratization of digital
technology, a significant proportion would not be able to
vote, which would therefore be discriminatory. Future evoting applications must therefore be aware of this problem.
F. NEW PROBLEMS WITH BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLGOY

The paper [4] presents new issues raised using blockchain
technology for e-voting applications.
Blockchain is designed to be decentralized and managed
by multiple actors. This means that blockchain protocols
require governance and coordination, which can be difficult
to manage. Hence, the blockchain technology introduces
more complexity into software and into its management as
well. This additional complexity causes problems in fixing
bugs and deploying new software. Because a decentralized
system does not have a single point of control, any protocol
change, even to fix vulnerabilities, requires coordination. The
advantage of the blockchain thus becomes its disadvantage:
it takes longer to address security flaws in a decentralized
system than in a centralized one. Blockchain systems can be
vulnerable for longer periods of time than their centralized
counterparts. The ability to quickly fix bugs is a priority for
a voting application, but the blockchain technology cannot
ensure it.
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Another problem is that the use of new consensus protocols or cryptographic primitives is strongly discouraged
if they have not been thoroughly tested by the industry
first. The papers [106] and [107] illustrate that distributed
consensus protocols and cryptographic systems are difficult
to implement properly.
G. CHALLENGES RELATED TO BUGS IN SMART
CONTRACTS

Decentralized applications using smart contracts pose new
security challenges. Indeed, vulnerabilities in smart contracts
have been exploited, resulting in massive financial losses.
The Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) was
vulnerable to "reentrancy" and the exploitation, detailed in
[108], led to the loss of 3.6 million Ether. The authors in
[109] propose a study of attacks on Ethereum smart contracts
discoveblack before 2017. The authors in [110] present a
framework for analyzing and verifying both runtime safety
and functional correctness of Ethereum smart contracts. This
framework allows the detection of "reentrancy" and "exception confusion" vulnerabilities. In [111], the authors propose
Oyente which is an execution tool made to detect vulnerabilities in Ethereum smart contracts and which was able to
detect an "exception confusion" vulnerability in 28% of the
analyzed smart contracts. However, this framework proposed
in [110] and this tool proposed in [111] are still immature
because they cannot detect low-level vulnerabilities and only
support Ethereum. They also need to be updated when new
vulnerabilities are discoveblack. Currently, smart contracts
do not have a mature regulatory framework [112].
VI. DISCUSSION ABOUT E-VOTING
A. EXPERIMENTS WITH E-VOTING

Before blockchain, e-voting already existed in Europe and
around the world. Several e-voting systems, which do not
use blockchain, have been introduced in Estonia, Switzerland
and Norway [113]. In Estonia and Switzerland, e-voting has
shown very satisfactory results, but in Norway it was abandoned in 2014 for security reasons and because e-voting did
not substantially blackuce the abstention rate. Nevertheless,
in Estonia, in the last parliamentary elections of 2019, almost
44% of the votes were cast online, which is an unprecedented
score, marking the success of this voting method among the
population.
In any case, whether these experiments worked or not, they
have allowed to test e-voting in real conditions on a national
scale, which is not yet the case for blockchain. They have
highlighted the possible flaws of such a system that are not
tolerated for such issues. Moreover, it is important to specify
that these implementations remain centralized and therefore
subject to drawbacks that the blockchain allow to mitigate,
thanks to its decentralized nature. But first, let’s take a closer
look at the considerations to have when judging the proper
functioning of an e-voting application.

B. LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR
E-VOTING

Because of its institutional nature, e-voting must first be
consideblack from a legal and political perspective [113].
1) Legal Aspects

The standards and regulations of the various countries define
the criteria and prerequisites for voting, whether it is on
paper or online. In the study [113], it is stated that any evoting application must first comply with the fundamental
principles enshrined in the law. Thus, a direct vote must be
universal, fair, free and, above all, secret. Apart from the
criterion of free voting, which does not seem to be particularly threatened by the e-vote [114], the other three must be
taken into consideration. Universal suffrage means that all
adult citizens are called to vote, and have the opportunity to
do so. However, given the digital divide caused by the lack
of basic computer skills and Internet connection problems
of many people (elderly but not only), many citizens would
be excluded from electronic voting, which is not acceptable.
Massive training of digitally challenged people should therefore be consideblack a prerequisite for e-voting, regardless of
the technology chosen. We will come back to this point at the
end of this paper. Concerning the fairness of the e-vote, i.e.
that with a voter is associated a unique vote, it is also very
difficult to ensure compablack to the paper vote. Indeed, it is
very difficult to verify perfectly the identity of the person who
votes remotely. There is nothing to ensure that the person
who votes is the person he claims to be. The question of the
authentication system of the voter is thus essential, and we
studied it more in detail in section IV. Finally, confidentiality
is also one of the fundamental principles of voting guaranteed
by law. This criterion depends considerably on the implementation and the quality of the e-voting system. We will see
how blockchain meets this constraint particularly well.
Even if an e-voting solution meets these expectations, the
authors of the report [113] specify that an evolution of the
regulatory framework of the countries wishing to set up an
e-voting system will have to be conducted.
2) Political Aspects

The choice to implement e-voting has political consequences
that cannot be excluded from the analysis. The Trust of all
voters in the voting system is essential for the outcome of an
election to be consideblack valid. The underlying question
of the transparency of the voting system is therefore to
be taken into account when choosing a voting technology.
This transparency in paper voting is ensublack by the physical counting of the ballots, controlled and assublack by
the citizens. Nevertheless, in non-democratic countries, this
transparency criterion is undermined when the ballots are
counted, hidden to the population. E-voting should therefore
address this issue and allow citizens to see how votes are
counted and how the system works in general. This constraint
also seems to be particularly well respected by e-voting via
Blockchain. One should not forget the financial costs of
9
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developing and implementing such a voting technology, as it
involves public money. The cost-effectiveness balance must
be carefully studied, so that the system is not doomed to failure in the long term. Finally, the role of private companies
in the implementation of such a system is a major issue [100].
In the course of our analysis, we encounteblack a number
of e-voting applications developed by private organizations
that offer interesting innovations. But the interference of
private companies in a public vote raises questions, both
from an ethical and political perspective. Estonia has largely
developed its own e-voting technologies, but more and more
voting experiments have been conducted through a partnership between private companies and states. Blockchain
relies primarily on private investment at the moment, so this
question must be asked.

Among these constraints, the provision of broadband internet
access for all, or the possibility of a paper alternative are not
directly related to the voting application but to the public
authority in charge of the election. However, compliance
with all other criteria is primarily the responsibility of the
e-voting application. Some e-voting applications seem to
respect some of these constraints, as shown for example by
the Estonian elections. The EU is also conducting pilot work
in this direction in order to introduce a secure and reliable evoting system [83]. In the course of this article, we see how
the blockchain may, or may not, address these constraints
more effectively than more traditionally used technologies
for e-voting.

C. TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR E-VOTING

Although blockchain-based e-voting systems are still in their
infancy (less than a decade old), several case studies have
been reported on these systems. The case study presented in
[116] shows how to digitize the European Election process
by following a method designed and tested on the Ethereum
blockchain. In another case study [117], the technology non
profit Democracy Earth Foundation launched the e-voting
platform to allow Colombians abroad to cast symbolic votes
through the platform in the context of approving a peace
treaty. The case study in [118] describes a blockchainbased mobile e-voting application that was deployed in 2018
in West Virginia for overseas military voters in the U.S.
midterm elections, as well as for smaller-scale elections. A
blockchain-based e-voting system was also used in Moscow,
Russia, for the city council elections [119].
On the other hand, some research projects are ongoing to
consider the use of blockchain for e-voting. For example,
a system in Japan will be based on social security cards to
verify the identity of voters and on blockchain to prevent the
falsification of any registeblack data [120]. Currently, this
system is being tested to cast votes on social contribution
projects. Another project that is VotingDAO which brings a
fully decentralized e-voting system to the blockchain, where
the system will be governed by a smart contract to ensure
its transparency, reliability and accountability [121]. Moreover, companies like Voatz and Follow My Vote are using
blockchain technology to create a new e-voting system. It is
worth noting that some accblackited international observers
have used blockchain to ensure that election data is thirdparty verifiable and protected against the possibility of tampering [122].

Once the legal and political constraints have been established,
we can now define the technical constraints that an e-voting
application must respect [115]. These constraints can be
divided into two main groups: those related to the human and
those related to the technology.
•

Human-related constraints may include the following:
-- Have an easy-to-use voting system: usability.
-- Guarantee citizens that their vote remains secret
and that their identity cannot be traced from their
vote: privacy and confidentiality.
-- Prove to citizens that the voting system is working
properly (i.e., prove that votes are being counted
and stoblack correctly): transparency, audit and
voter-verifiability.
-- Prevent the intervention of an outsider to force
another to vote in a certain way (i.e., prevent intimidation, fraud, forced vote selling, etc.): resistance
to coercion. We note that this criterion is complicated to apply in the absence of a voting booth.
-- Do not discriminate against voters who cannot or
will not have access to the Internet by offering
an alternative to e-voting with their own devices:
eligibility.

•

Technology-related constraints may include the following:
-- Address the inequality of internet access opportunities between different socio-demographic
groups. Some people who currently have poor internet connections need to be able to vote.
-- Prevent any attack, system failure or connection
failure.
-- Consideration of the possible presence of viruses
or malware on voters’ personal computers that
could (1) distort the voting decision and/or (2)
affect the overall Internet voting system.
-- Ensure voter authentication.
-- Prevent multiple voting.

D. CASE STUDIES AND ONGOING RESEARCH
PROJECTS

VII. CONCLUSION

Blockchain appears as an interesting alternative to traditional voting systems. The world of blockchain is a constantly evolving ecosystem, as many are created while others disappear. Indeed, in the scientific literature, more and
more research works propose e-voting applications based
on blockchain. Nevertheless, only a few of the proposed
solutions have been implemented in real life and none have
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been tested on a large scale. Therefore, it is very difficult to
conclude that blockchain is a fully secure alternative to conduct a national election nowadays. Although the principles on
which blockchain is based are secure, e-voting applications
are still vulnerable to several attacks. This makes it very
challenging to guarantee the integrity of an election, which
is problematic given the stakes of such an application.
Moreover, it is important to note that blockchain does
not eliminate the need for a central authority to organize an
election. Any organization of a country-wide election necessarily implies a minimal amount of centralization, mainly to
produce the list of eligible voters. However, there are other
avenues that can be exploblack for the use of blockchain in
future elections. While the use of blockchain alone to organize a vote seems unrealistic now, it is possible to envisage
its use as a complement to current systems. For example, one
could imagine using a blockchain to count paper votes at the
level of each municipality or region, thereby blackucing the
risk of fraud and lack of trust. Furthermore, in countries with
large territories, a voting application using blockchain on the
smartphone (in addition to physical polling stations) would
allow for a greater participation of people initially excluded
from the democratic process due to their geographical isolation.
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